Social Immune Mechanisms: Luhmann and Potentialization Technologies by Andersen, Niels Åkerstrøm & Stenner, Paul
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Social immune mechanisms: Luhmann and
potentialisation technologies
Journal Item
How to cite:
Andersen, Niels A˚. and Stenner, Paul (2019). Social immune mechanisms: Luhmann and potentialisation
technologies. Theory, Culture & Society (Early Access).
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2019 The Authors
Version: Accepted Manuscript
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1177/0263276419868768
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
 1 
Social immune mechanisms: Luhmann and 
potentialisation technologies  
 
Neils Åkerstrøm Andersen and Paul Stenner 
 
Abstract 
Contemporary discourses of management are full of encouragements to ‘expect the unexpected’ and 
to celebrate ‘the future of the future’. Many new public managerial technologies of change – such 
as steering Labs, future games, and managerial performance arts - promise the co- creative 
‘potentialisation’ of employees, citizens and organisations. This paper approaches such 
potentialisation technologies as immune mechanisms which serve to protect the social system from 
itself. From a perspective inspired by autopoietic systems theory, potentialisation technologies 
provide autoimmunity by problematising institutional structures and providing ‘anti-structural’ 
space-times to facilitate transformation. There is a price to pay for this immune function, however, 
since these immune mechanisms cannot discriminate between productive and unproductive 
structures. By dissolving the certainty of the expectations that underlie the connectivity of diverse 
organisational operations, they risk harming the welfare systems that host them.  
 
Introduction 
 
Contemporary discourses of management and governance are full of encouragements to ‘expect the 
unexpected’, to ‘think the unthinkable’ and to celebrate ‘the future of the future’ and their practice 
is now populated by a host of devices to facilitate these possibilities, including steering Labs, future 
games, managerial performance arts, freedom letters, trust-based partnerships, and so on. Andersen 
and Pors (2016) call these ‘technologies of potentialisation’ and have studied their operations in the 
context of the Danish Welfare State. Using three such devices as examples, this article uses 
Luhmann’s autopoietic systems theory to reframe the broader sociological implications of these 
developments. In particular, we investigate Luhmann’s notion of a societal immune system with its 
(auto)immune mechanisms that serve to protect social systems from disturbances arising from their 
own structures. For Luhmann, the disturbances that warrant these defensive measures are associated 
with contradictions and conflicts, including the conflicts that can flare up around contradictions that 
are not appropriately ‘conditioned’. For this very reason, Luhmann argues, it is precisely 
contradictions and conflict that serve - when conditioned by an ‘immune system’ such as law - as an 
immune mechanism.  
 
By addressing technologies of potentialisation using Luhmann’s immunological concepts, this 
article aims to open a new horizon of research problems. Specifically, we explore the value of 
addressing these technologies in terms of their emergence as an alternative to law and indeed as a 
means of immunisation against law. Where the legal ‘immune system’ transforms conflict and 
contradiction into legal structures, potentialisation technologies challenge and dissolve structure as 
such, without discriminating between productive and unproductive structures. The value of this 
theorisation is the insight it provides into the societal costs of potentialisation, and the related 
problem of their regulation. To this end, the paper begins with a defence of Luhmann’s relevance 
based upon a sketch of his arguments about law as a societal immune system which uses conflict / 
contradiction as its immune mechanism. A second section introduces three examples of 
potentialisation technologies. The third section discusses the extent to which potentialisation 
technologies serve an immune function comparable to that ascribed to law in Luhmann’s account. 
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The conclusion addresses some of the societal implications of the spread of potentialisation 
technologies. 
 
Taking Luhmannian immunologic seriously 
 
Despite much scepticism towards Luhmann on the part of Anglophone social scientists, there is a 
small but established tradition of Anglophone scholarship on Luhmann (e.g. King, 1993, King and 
Schutz, 1994, Thornhill and King, 2003). This work, however, rarely mentions the immunological 
aspects of Luhmann’s theory, which were first spelled out in the mid-eighties (Luhmann,1985). In 
the context of social theory, the concept of immunity is more likely to be associated with the work 
of Haraway (1989), Derrida (2003, 2005), Sloterdijk (2011) and with the syntheses offered by 
Esposito (2011, Richter (2016) and Wolfe (2017). Our account of immunity is informed by this 
theoretical work, but our main concern is to concretely illuminate some recent empirical changes in 
the functioning of societal immunity in a way that allows a diagnosis of the sociological present. In 
addition to this empirical concern, we hope also to exhibit a recent tendency to integrate Luhmann’s 
work with alternative traditions like the psycho-social (Brown and Stenner, 2009), deconstruction 
(Teubner, 2001, Staheli 2012), Deleuze (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2013), Koselleck 
(Andersen, 2011), and Serres (Stenner, 2005). Still, some skepticism about Luhmann remains due 
to the mixture of a) its apparent rejection of the radically progressive political stance that is often 
identified with sociology, b) its association with the structural functionalism of Parsons, and c) its 
ontological commitment to an autopoietic systems theory derived from biology. Since these are 
concerns indeed, before addressing our core theme of potentialisation we will first unfold the 
theoretical basis of Luhmann’s immunological perspective in a manner that addresses each criticism 
in turn.  
 
a) Luhmann’s rejection of sociological radicalism: Structure contrasted with immune system 
 
In contrast to sociologists who advance a critical ‘no’ to society, Luhmann appears to bolster a 
political liberalism, and to prefer a ‘yes’. Indeed, his account of an immune system through which 
society can respond to its own alarms is itself motivated by a concern to ask how a ‘necessary “yes” 
to society can be regained’ (Luhmann, 1995: 404). Luhmann aims to short-circuit the familiar 
contrast between a normatively conservative legal system, and critical activism aiming for unrest 
and supporting social movements against ‘society’ (403). Luhmann reformulates this oppositional 
contrast between ‘the politico-economic complex of modern capitalism’ and ‘the totality of the 
social movements stimulated by it’ as precisely a distinction between societal structures and 
society’s immune system (404). From this perspective, law and social movements both show up as 
immune systems. They share the common feature of using contradictions to open social structure to 
a controlled form of instability, and hence to the possibility of structural change permitting new 
internal complexity. In Luhmann’s account, the immune system is destabilising of structure as 
much as it is conservative, and he insists that one ‘must guard against the widespread error of 
thinking that destabilization as such is dysfunctional’ (367). On the contrary, for Luhmann (404) 
modern society, ‘in contrast with all historical predecessors, has destabilized its structures and 
considerably enhanced its potential for saying no’.  
 
The issue of communicating ‘yes’ and ‘no’ is thus directly relevant to Luhmann’s immunological 
account. He defines both contradiction and conflict in terms of the articulation of a ‘no’ and he 
states that social systems ‘exist as communication systems; therefore they create contradictions by 
communicating rejection. This too can come under logic’s control. Somehow it must be possible to 
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know whether a “no” that has been communicated contradicts an expectation or merely contours it’ 
(Luhmann, 1995: 364). Later, he makes clear that conflict, at its core, is contradiction: ‘We will 
therefore speak of conflict when a communication is contradicted, or when a contradiction is 
communicated… The concept of conflict is thereby related to a precise… communicative 
occurrence: to a communicated “no” that answers the previous communication’ (388-9). The 
difference is that unlike contradictions, conflicts form distinctive self-reproducing social systems of 
their own. Conflicts can flare up and quickly spread because the double contingency that underlies 
all communication (I expect that you expect that I expect) assumes the negative form of: I do not do 
what you want when you do not do what I want. The prevailing assumption of positive connectivity 
is thus reversed and takes the form: ‘everything that harms you, benefits me’. (Luhmann, 2000: 
451). In this way, conflict forms a self-catalysing system which can exist parasitically ‘on the side’ 
of any other social system (Serres, 1983). It uses the contradictions at play in its ‘host’ as fuel for its 
own process, a process which tends to burn any social structure it encounters, de-differentiating 
conventional distinctions in its wake.  
 
Even accepting that they are themselves a type of social system, conflicts pose a real danger to the 
long-term autopoiesis of any social system. They ‘tend to draw the host system into conflict to the 
extent that the attention and all resources are claimed for the conflict’ (Luhmann, 1995: 390). 
Conflicts are thus inherently ambivalent: they are simultaneously that against which social systems 
require immunisation, and that which can serve as the very mechanisms for immunisation. Conflicts 
are made out of contradictions, but contradictions themselves need not be a systematic ‘call to arms’ 
(all’arme!). Instead contradictions can, when appropriately conditioned, serve merely as alarms 
alerting the system to aspects of its structures that are proving problematic. This would be a matter 
of the recruitment of conflict as an immune mechanism. When recruited in this way, an immune 
mechanism creates expectable insecurities out of contradictions, and these structured insecurities 
can then be managed another way. Law, for example, recruits contradictions as exactly such an 
immune mechanism, and in this sense law is meta-parasitical: it parasites the more dangerous 
parasite of unconditioned conflict.  
 
Luhmann argues that social movements operate in a comparable way, through recruiting and 
transforming the ‘no’ of contradiction. That law typically says ‘no’ from a position of power and 
authority while critical social movements do so from a position of oppression ought not to distract 
us from the immunological implications of their common negation. If law and social movements 
can be ascribed this function of immunity in contrast with ‘structure’, this is because both provide 
means for the transformation of disturbances (‘noise’) taking the form of conflicts within social 
systems. In short, for Luhmann, the question of immunity within social systems is a question of the 
relationship a system can adopt to the threat of the disturbance of its communicative operations by 
conflict and contradiction.  
 
b) Luhmann’s relation to structural functionalism: Structure contrasted with event 
 
The contrast between structure and immunity described above raises the second issue of Luhmann’s 
alleged ‘structural functionalism’. In fact, Luhmann (e.g. 1995, Ch.8) repeatedly differentiates his 
theory from that of Parsons, and from structuralism. When he does so he stresses the processual 
basis of his theory, a basis which entails a thorough rethinking of the concepts of ‘structure’ and 
‘function’. With respect to structure, he builds on the core link made by structuralists between 
structure and complexity whereby ‘structure transforms unstructured complexity into structured 
complexity’ (282). The question, however, is ‘how?’ Here, Luhmann follows the process 
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philosophy of A.N. Whitehead in a more profound way than does Parsons, since Luhmann affirms 
the implications of Whitehead’s thesis that the ultimate realities are not structures, but events 
(‘actual occasions’). Luhmann calls these events a system’s elements, which are always concrete 
operations. This Whiteheadian inspiration is fundamental to Luhmann: ‘Above all’, he writes, ‘one 
must radically relate the concept of event, and with it the concept of action, to what is momentary 
and immediately passes away’ (287). If the concrete realities are events that occur and then perish 
and hence that do not endure in time, then structure ‘loses its central position’ (281) and is 
reformulated as a concept which ‘defines more precisely how elements relate across temporal 
distance’ (282). Structure is that which enables events to outlast the transiency of the moment, and 
it is therefore necessarily something abstracted from the concreteness of real events. Structure 
enhances the probability of the improbable, and consists in ‘how permissible relations are 
constrained within the system’ (283). It limits possibility by creating, for any possible event, a 
circumscribed realm of real, expectable, possibilities.  
 
For Whitehead, this premise that actual occasions are a) ultimate elements and b) composed into 
forms possessing different degrees of enduring ‘structure’, applies to all systems or ‘organisms’, 
from the physical through the biological to the sociocultural. Luhmann’s main concern as a 
sociologist is with human societies, which presuppose and exceed biological and psychic systems. 
If social systems ‘exist as communication systems’, this means that the real occurrences composing 
human societies are events of communication. Since here we are dealing with a question of 
meaning (each communicative event being a unity of utterance, understanding and information), the 
question of structural constraints is a matter of the formation of expectations, and hence also of 
‘semantics’. Expectations provide the means for one transient communicative event to connect with 
another and hence to begin the process of forming a meaningful series: ‘social structures are 
expectational structures’ (292). A social system, in Luhmann’s terms, endures to the extent that it is 
an internally coherent stream of communicative events, each conditioning the next and forming a 
connected series which, taken in its temporal togetherness, acquires an autonomy beyond any 
individual person. If such a system is self-reproducing or, to use the biological jargon ‘autopoietic’, 
this is because, ultimately, the events are the self-creating realities that, in concert, and via the vivid 
immediacy of their arising and perishing, reproduce the structures they require. The concept of 
function undergoes a comparable reformulation. A function is no longer the job proper to a pre-
given structure but rather a focus from which a range of potential solutions to a marked problem can 
be compared (Luhmann, 2000: 138). 
  
These arguments can be illustrated by reference to law. For Luhmann (1995, p.374) the legal 
system functions ‘immunologically’ by processing contradictions / conflicts and hence ‘law is 
formed in anticipation of possible conflict’. Since conflict and contradiction both entail the 
articulation of a ‘no’, they disturb the connectivity whereby communicative events can form a 
structured system: they disrupt the systems’ autopoiesis. In this sense law does not avoid conflict, 
but feeds on it, thus transforming it. Conflict and contradiction are thus deployed by law as immune 
mechanisms precisely because they dissolve the security of social expectations (i.e. ‘structure’): 
contradictions ‘put into question the already-achieved determinacy of meaning’ (361) and reveal an 
insecurity of expectation that destabilises a system. In this way, law greatly expands the 
possibilities for conflicts whilst preventing and mediating their violent resolution and uncontrolled 
escalation. Contradictions or conflicts that might otherwise threaten a social system’s self-
reproduction are thus captured, conditioned and recruited as immune mechanisms by the legal 
‘immune system’: their disturbing potential is domesticated through a coding into legal / illegal, 
permitted / forbidden. Law lodges itself as the top of a parasitical chain and feeds on what conflicts 
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have already made out of contradictions, converting both into the form of an immune mechanism 
that structures insecurity by rendering the unexpected newly expectable. This is why, for Luhmann, 
an immune system is less about preventing change by annihilating external dangers than about 
enhancing the system’s sensitivity, and as such is a key factor in societal evolution and change. Law 
qua immune system functions to increase the social system’s sensitivity and to enhance its tolerance 
for complexity and structural insecurity. Conflict and contradiction are immune mechanisms not 
because they protect the system against external threats, but because they provide an ‘inwards’ 
means to protect the system’s continued autopoiesis from inappropriate structures created by itself 
over time.  
 
c) Luhmann’s commitment to biology: Structure contrasted with self-reproduction 
 
If an immune system enables a system to protect itself against its own structures then clearly 
immunity is always also autoimmunity (see also Derrida, 2005, 2003). This point is crucial and 
easily misunderstood. For Luhmann, immunity does not protect social structures or enable their 
continued reproduction, but protects society in a more primordial way against those of its structures 
which are proving sufficiently troublesome to trigger ‘alarm signals’ within an immune system. 
This entails a distinction between structure and self-reproduction or autopoiesis (see Luhmann, 
1995, p. 369). In diverging from the classical biological view of the immune system as the part of 
the organism that defends it against external attacks, Luhmann closely follows developments within 
biology itself.  He orients towards a systems theoretical form of biology that arguably escapes the 
oft-criticised biological reductionism – of which Durkheim and Parsons stand accused - that would 
model sociology so problematically upon biology. A turning point was the work conducted in the 
mid-1970s by the Danish immunologist Niels Jerne who demonstrated how the body's production 
of antibodies was organised into networks. Francisco Varela reconstrued these networks as 
autopoietic systems. From this perspective, what constitutes an immune system is not the mere 
collection of antibodies and other agents, but their recruitment and linkage into a self-generating, 
self-referential and self-learning network (Varela et al, 1993). Varela, for example, describes a 
movement from an antigen-centred to an organism-centred immunology (Varela 1979: 216). Varela 
(1995: 213) argues that: ‘Classic immunology understands immunology in military terms as a 
defence system against invaders. […] If this made sense, the system would shrink to nothing if 
there are no invaders. Yet when mice are raised in milieus free from external challenge, their 
immune systems are normal!’  
 
For Varela the immune system functions as much by creating tolerance to antigens as by destroying 
them (see also Haraway, 1989 and Esposito, 2011: 8), and it does so as a self-generating network 
capable of ‘observing’ and differentially reacting to events. We might say that its familiar 
‘classical’ function of hostility (reactive destruction of antigens) has been supplemented within 
systems theory by a more primordial function of hospitality (flexible incorporation of antigens). In 
fact, Varela distinguishes a central from a peripheral immune system where the former is a flexible 
and dynamic network of heterogeneous antibodies concerned mainly with tolerance and 
connectivity, whilst the latter is composed of more loosely coupled antibodies free to attack those 
antigens ‘observed’ as problematic (Varela, Coutinho and Stewart, 1993: 215-216). ‘Observation’ 
here clearly does not imply vision, but a form of discrimination made possible when an autopoietic 
system interacts with antigens through its operations. An autopoeitic system has no direct contact 
with its environment, but ‘constructs’ it only by way of its ongoing and recursive reactions and 
activities. It is in this sense of being directed ‘inwards’ that all immune reactions are also 
‘autoimmune’: 
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All immune events are directed inward, not outward, and the organism perceives the 
penetration of foreign materials not by recognising them as foreign, but rather because 
the foreign material interferes with ongoing reactions that exist as links in complex 
network interactions… Thus, in a way, all immune reactions are “autoimmune” 
(directed inward) and exogenous antigens are recognized by “cross reactions” (Varela, 
1979: 231-232). 
 
Hence, it is only through interacting with the antigens through its operations, that the antigens 
become distinguishable for the system. Varela neatly expresses this changed view of the 
relationship between the immune system, the environment and the organism when he insists that the 
organism does not directly ‘perceive’ the ‘foreign material’ but rather detects interference within 
the ongoing reactions of its own network of operations. 
 
Luhmann’s orientation towards a systems theoretical form of biology escapes the usual sociological 
charge of biological reductionism. Indeed, his theory does not derive from biology, but is part of a 
broader ‘transdisciplinary’ tradition of systems theory which includes the work mathematicians, 
physicists, biologists, psychologists and sociologists (Pia, 2003). Employing von Bertalanffy’s 
(1950) distinction between a ‘general’ systems theory, and theories of specific system types, a 
theory of immunologic would be a general matter with homologous manifestations in multiple 
system types (whether organic, psychological or social). On this basis, Luhmann’s description of 
societal immune mechanisms is not metaphorical. Indeed, the word ‘immunity’ was social before 
becoming biological. ‘Immunis’ meant ‘not paying a share’ and was used in Ancient Latin to 
indicate situations of exemption from taxes or other liabilities. This does not mean, of course, that 
biological, psychological and social systems are identical: Luhmann’s first step is to insist that 
social systems are unique in that they operate with communication. It is only with social systems 
that the general distinction between structure and self-reproduction takes the specific form of a 
distinction between expectation and action (Luhmann, 1995, p. 369). Social structures are based on the 
establishment over time of expectations which differentially sensitise the system’s engagements 
with what it takes to be its environment.  Health communication for example, has built up, and 
continually renews, expectation structures (a division of roles between doctors and patients, medical 
diagnoses, treatments that respond to diagnoses and so on). These expectations enhance the 
connectivity and predictability of the systems’ operations. But more fundamental to a social system 
than its structures is the continuation of the operations through which it secures its autopoetic self-
reproduction. Structures serve autopoeisis but the autopoeitically created system (self-reproduction 
through action) is more than, and irreducible to, its structures. It is in this precise sense that the 
logic of immunity is anti-structural: 
 
 
The system does not immunize itself against the no, but with help of the no: it does 
not protect itself against changes, but with the help of changes against rigidifying into 
repeated, but not environmentally adequate, patterns of behaviour. The immune 
system does not protect structure, but autopoiesis, the system’s closed self-
reproduction (Luhmann, 1995: 371-372).  
 
Synthesis: structure and potentialisation 
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We hope this introduction to Luhmann’s immuno-logic serves also to immunise our readers against 
a rapid rejection of his sociology. We have addressed three criticisms by illuminating three 
interconnected points of contrast with the concept of structure: self-reproduction, event and immune 
system. Self-reproduction and event are linked through the concept of autopoiesis, since autopoiesis 
is effectively the self-reproduction of the events that fundamentally constitute any system. In turn, 
an immune system is that which allows autopoiesis to carry on despite disturbances that challenge 
its continuity. Under such conditions the system is prepared to sacrifice its structures to protect 
autopoiesis. Together, this interwoven skein of concepts allow us to grasp why immunity relates to 
structure, and why it might be implicated, not just in defensive reactions, but also in the 
transformation of structure.  
 
To return briefly to his primary example of law as immune system, Luhmann (2004) shows how the 
court-room serves regulate the formation of conflicts by moving them into law. If law dissolves 
structures that have proven problematic, then clearly it is able to do so only thanks to its own form 
as an authoritative and highly structured system capable of imposing expectations of its own, 
supported by the force of the state. In what Luhmann (1995, p. 374) calls the ‘modern welfare 
society’, however, law begins ‘to overtake itself, so to speak: new kinds of situations are introduced 
as conflict decided in advance, situations that no one would have thought of without law, and the 
resulting expectations are declared to be law’. We now raise the possibility that, at this point, law 
itself becomes a structure observed to be a problematic source of conflict, and not just a solution. 
Law’s immune function is being supplemented, and challenged, by new forms of immunity. These 
forms are not mechanisms based on a re-structuring of conflicts through a juridical appropriation, 
nor on their recruitment into social movements. Instead, devices are developed which create 
conditions in which structures that are judged problematic are held in suspense such that 
possibilities that might otherwise be structurally excluded are summoned and entertained. These  
new means of immunity operate with technologies of potentialisation which function in spite of 
law. This is a significant claim in itself, but the argument matters also because there may be a price 
to pay for this new immune function. Since these immune mechanisms cannot discriminate between 
productive and unproductive structures, they dissolve the certainty of the expectations that underlie 
the connectivity of diverse organisational operations and risk harming the social systems that host 
them: they challenge structure as such. They deconstruct professionalism but leave nothing in its 
wake. Under these circumstances, this question of the generation and tolerance of insecurity, 
uncertainty and instability becomes one of the central issues of our time (Szakolzkai, 2017).  
 
Three examples of potentialisation technologies 
 
Example 1: From reality to the ideal and back again 
 
During a work away-day, a group of managers and employees from a Health Trust are preparing to 
play a game together. Following some friendly ice-breaking banter, Sally – who is a manager acting 
as team-leader - presents the game as a fun opportunity to reflect on their current and future practice 
as health professionals. She divides those present into three groups, giving each a sheet of paper 
containing the grid shown in figure 1: 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
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Each group is invited to use the grid to have a playful dialogue about how they view their Health 
Trust. They begin with the upper left cell, discussing how their Health Trust operates now. 
Conversation exhausted, they move to the top right cell and discuss what is possible for it now. 
They then begin to speculate about what will be the case in five years time, before finally turning to 
the bottom right cell which invites discussion about what will be possible for the Health Trust in 
five years from now. The room buzzes with different perspectives and possibilities. Sally asks each 
group to nominate a member to summarise their group discussion. In a plenary, she invites general 
discussion about the perspectives that have emerged. What does Kesi think of Pedro’s ideas about 
what is possible now? Does Julia agree with the things that Morten implied will exist in five years 
time but are not possible now? What does Neil think it will take to move the Health Trust from 
‘what it is now’ to ‘what will be possible five years from now’?  
 
Example 2:Sisters Academy: School in a sensual society  
 
At the invitation of the head teacher, a school in Odense, Denmark is taken over for a week by a 
group of activist performance artists called Sisters Academy. ‘The aim’, announces one of the 
group ‘is to experiment with how a school might look in a society that is guided by aesthetic terms - 
the sensual and poetic perception of the world’ (Sisters Academy, 2013). The school’s schedule of 
classes continues, but the entire environment is transformed using techniques of light, sound and set 
design: ‘We use performance art to create an immersive otherworldly frame where we can free our 
minds and bodies to think and feel in radical ways’ (Sisters Academy # 3: http: 
//sistersacademy.dk/gallery/). The usual school timetable is unaltered, but the practices that take 
place are transformed by a new ‘inspirational framework’ which foregrounds the aesthetic 
dimension of existence. Teachers are invited to experiment during their lessons based on the motto 
‘what if aesthetics were the highest value, how would your subject and teaching look?’ For 
example, Peter, the English teacher, experiments with a new poetic teaching self he calls 
‘blackbird’, whilst pupils sit together on the floor, wearing face paint. Teachers and Sisters wear 
fancy dress and explore silence, touch and other sensory experiences with their pupils. A shape-
shifter gives pupils envelopes of confetti to be emptied onto their heads. Everything is ‘turned 
around and upside down’ and, as one pupil remarks: ‘we arrived first day and nobody knew what to 
expect, we had all these expectations, I had all these expectations, we didn’t know anything and it 
completely surprised us in a good way’.  
 
Example 3: Resource Trajectory through Rehabilitation Teams 
 
Svend is a Danish police officer seeking early retirement due to chronic pain following a traffic 
accident. Before 2013, the decision concerning his case for retirement would have been made on the 
basis of a more or less objective assessment of his health limitations. But now the law has changed 
and Svend must participate in a new dialogue and coordination forum involving an interdisciplinary 
team. His particular ‘Rehabilitation Team’ consists of a medical doctor, a psychologist, a lawyer, 
and a social worker, each with a specific administrative perspective on his case. Before examining 
his retirement rights, the Team must first explore the possibilities for continued employment that 
are available, or might be developed, for this specific client. In this case, instead of recommending a 
retirement decision, the Rehabilitation Team draw up a Resource Trajectory which spells out what 
should be made available to Svend to enable him to remain employed. Ditte, the psychologist, 
observes that Svend’s wellbeing may be diminished by early retirement, and that counselling 
opportunities and a bespoke exercise routine should be made available to help him self-manage the 
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pain. The team communicate to Svend that it is more valuable for all concerned to focus on what he 
can do than on what his limitations are.  
 
Why ‘technologies’?: devices for structuralisation and for liminalisation  
 
Each of our three examples is a technology because each employs a tool, concept or some other 
method which can repeatably achieve, in different circumstances of application, a desired effect (in 
this case, the opening of possibilities). The first example uses the device of a game. The second 
uses techniques from theatre and performance arts. The third uses the method of a ‘Rehabilitation 
Team’ and the tool of a ‘Resource Trajectory’ which slides smoothly between any early retirement 
application, and any legally binding decision. These devices have a form that is durable enough to 
be put to use on multiple occasions to engender comparable results, albeit with all kinds of 
adaptations tailored to the circumstances. Luhmann suggests that something can be considered a 
technology when it assumes the specific form of operating with a difference between the reduced 
complexity of repeatable cause-effect relationships, and ‘uncapped’ causal relationships that have 
yet to be determined (Luhmann, 1990). Technology, in this definition, is a ‘dodge to live’ 
(Whitehead, 1929, p.18). It isolates specific cause-effect relationships and deploys a methodology 
to bring them into a form that can produce reliably repeatable effects within the ‘uncapped’ domain 
to which it is applied. 
 
But as technologies, these devices are clearly distinct the forms of ‘physical’ equipment and 
machinery that are based on the application of scientific knowledge of the material, external, 
physical world. From simple machines like levers and pulleys to complex engines, ‘physical’ 
technologies exploit demonstrable physical laws to produce effects that are predictable to a highly 
controllable degree. Since ‘structure’ is that which enhances the probability of the otherwise 
improbable, these physical technologies structuralise in that they amplify our capacity, not just to 
expect, but to know and to ‘make it so’. They are informed by scientific knowledge of repeatable 
causal patterns whose regularity lends its predictability to the ‘uncapped causal relationships that 
have yet to be determined’. Deviations, variations and accidents can be machined to a minimum of 
relevance, enhancing the power to ‘converge’ upon the repeatedly expectable. In comparing 
potentialisation technologies with these familiar ‘physical’ technologies, it is unwise to reach 
immediately for an ‘inner’ / ‘outer’ distinction, or for a distinction between soft ‘social’ 
technologies (Foucault’s ‘technologies of the self’ [1988]), and a hard material variety. Such 
distinctions are not irrelevant, of course, and indeed the Sisters Academy note that ‘we only have, 
like, we train our outer world. But we don’t train our inner world, so you must find techniques that 
work for you’ (http://sistersacademy.dk/gallery/). They obscure, however, a more basic difference 
between what we call a structuralising tendency (where enhanced expectations are set to enable the 
probability of the improbable), and a liminalising tendency (where set expectations are suspended 
in order to increase the pool of real possibilities available to be entertained).  
 
The structuralising tendency is ‘convergent’, ‘conformal’ and, as it were, ‘centripetal’. 
Structuralising technologies close down upon possibilities and constrict variability, tightening 
around a centre (see Valsiner, 2018). The liminalising tendency is ‘divergent’ and ‘centrifugal’, 
dispersing towards a de-differentiated periphery which is tolerant of deviation (Greco and Stenner, 
2017). Potentialisation technologies are liminalising in that they open possibilities and amplify 
variability. If the most familiar type of technology (including most ‘physical’ technologies) are 
means by which expectable patterns or forms are established and maintained, the latter type 
(including potentialisation technologies) are the means by which patterns which have outlived their 
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usefulness can be transformed so that new patterns can emerge. Here we contrast the two 
‘tendencies’ the better to clarify their difference, but they are related and often intertwined. If 
expectations function to reduce complexity in the name of probabilising a preferred outcome, for 
example, then removing them preserves the complexity that set expectations would eliminate. 
 
Whilst the potentialisation technologies we are discussing are a relatively recent development, it is 
possible to trace their connection to the much older forms of practice, such as rites of passage and 
carnival. Stenner (2017) has called these ‘liminal affective technologies’. The concept of liminality 
is classically contrasted with that of structure, and indeed Turner (1982) refers to liminal occasions 
as anti-structural, precisely because they are designed to facilitate transformation from one 
structured set of expectations to another. These are described as ‘affective’ for two reasons. First, 
because any suspension, removal or transformation of structure enhances the intensity of affective 
experience, which must therefore be ‘managed’ as part of the technology. Second, because these 
technologies directly engage the affective dimension to supply a new intensity and vitality of 
motivation. Historically speaking, long before law was developed to manage conflict, ‘liminal 
affectivity’ was summoned, managed and navigated by means of ritual and its attendant semantics 
of the sacred (Stenner, 2017). Although we cannot pursue the matter here, ritual can thus be 
considered an archaic but ever-renewed ancestor of the potentialisation technologies we are here 
considering.  
 
Why ‘potentialising’?: Opening possibilities within temporal, object and social dimensions 
 
Barel (1979) gives the name potentialisation to this recovery of possibilities provisionally excluded 
by structure (expectation), and points to its role in the emergence of new forms. Our three diverse 
examples evidently share in common a concern with the opening up of possibilities beyond the 
horizon of existing possibilities. We have selected examples that illustrate three different targets and 
vehicles through which possibilities are produced: potentialisation through the time dimension, the 
object dimension and the social dimension, although each one involves all of three dimensions on 
some level. 
 
Example 1 opens potentials by focussing primarily on the time dimension (for other examples, see 
Andersen, 2008 and Andersen and Pors, 2014). It assumes that a programmed playful dialogue is 
able to potentialise by opening up as yet unknown possibilities. The assumption in the game is that 
the imaginative capacity of managers and employees sets the ultimate limit to organisational 
change. Each part of the grid constructs time differently, and together time is made into something 
contingent. ‘What is now?’ constructs time as the present of the present whilst ‘what is possible 
now?’ constructs it as the present’s future. The question ‘what will be in five years?’ constructs the 
future’s present whilst ‘what will be possible in five years?’ constructs time as the future’s future. 
When temporal expectations are opened up through this temporal doubling, the game invites further 
discussion on perspectives. Here, potentialisation is about dissolving the expectation of security and 
predictability regarding the future. Potentialisation defends the organisational communication 
against entrenched expectations for the future and for the future of the future, and against 
entrenched expectations for the present and its possibilities. It articulates an implicit ‘no’ to certain 
time-bindings: namely those which assume a purely conformal relationship between past, present 
and future.  
 
Example 2 focuses primarily on the object dimension.  The aim is to open up new possibilities for 
the object ‘education’. Sisters Academy draw on the anthropological concept of ‘liminality’: their 
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'takeover' creates a 'liminal zone' giving the school the opportunity to transform itself through the 
playful question ‘what if?’ Answers to this question contribute towards ‘doubling’ the ordinary 
school into an extraordinary school of virtual potentiality. In this case, potentialisation is summoned 
by suspending the normal expectations about education and defending the ensuing communication 
against entrenched expectations about teaching and learning. Sisters Academy hint that the existing 
school is ‘a school of the industrial society’, and this invocation clearly questions the continued 
relevance of its structures for the present. The implication is that the old ‘industrial school’ might be 
transformed – via the ‘liminal zone’ of the intervention - into the new ‘sensual school’. They play 
with the historical idea that society has been dominated in turns by religion, policy, and economy, 
but that a future ‘sensual society’ might take its inspiration from aesthetics. The potentialisation 
technology thus stages a re-experiencing of the school that might usher in the ‘becoming’ of this 
‘sensual society’. If the ‘inspirational framework’ creates a subjunctive space-time in which 
education ‘might’ be transformed, then this is achieved by articulating a ‘no’ to the normal 
educational structures. Sisters Academy do not provide input on how to run the ordinary school: 
following the carnivalesque transformation it is left to the teachers and students to grasp these 
possibilities for the future.  
 
Example 3 opens possibilities by focussing primarily on the social dimension by addressing the 
problem of early retirement (other examples would be the ‘responsibility games’ discussed by 
Knudsen and Andersen, 2014). Since 2013 the Danish procedure for granting a pension for early 
retirement must, by law, involve a Rehabilitation Team who inform a Resource Trajectory (RTRT). 
RTRT ‘is a dialogue and coordination forum, which shall give an assessment in all cases, before 
decisions regarding resource trajectory (...) and early retirement are taken. (...) Based on the 
individual citizen’s overall situation, the aim of the rehabilitation team is to ensure interdisciplinary 
coordination and a holistic effort across administrations and authorities focusing on employment 
and education, so that the citizen as far as possible gets a connection to the labour market’ (Lov, 
2012: kap3a, paragraph 25). The older Danish law from 1965 specified a positive entitlement based 
on the observation of limitations: ‘The entitlement to an early retirement pension depends on that 
person's ability to work being reduced to the extent required by the law’ (Ministry of Social Affairs 
1965: 29). Hence an ‘early retirement pension’ involved an essentially positive decision 
compensating for the consequences of an incapacity or reduced capacity to work: what a person 
cannot do (Ministry of Social Affairs, 1965: 20). But roughly at the turn of the 21st Century a 
discussion arose expressing concern about the extent of early retirement. One official report states: 
‘It's about people who do not get the opportunity to realise their potential in an active working life. 
It is about future-proofing our welfare. And it is about our community and Danish business growth 
and job creation and new jobs, that do not benefit from the resources and skills of the many retired 
young people’ (Ministry of Employment 2012: 4). A contradiction is here articulated between the 
citizen's right to early retirement and their right to realise their potential. The older semantics of 
retirement rights based on what a person cannot do (i.e. a communicative form based on 
‘limitations of possibilities’) are thus confronted with semantics stressing what, given the right 
circumstances, people might be able to do (i.e. a form based on ‘possibilities despite limitations’). 
As put by a former Social Affairs Minister:  
 
‘The main aim of the reform, is to focus on people’s work abilities instead of how sick 
they are (...) After the reform the principal of social work will be the resources and 
value of the single individual. What counts is not the disabilities of an applicant, but 
what he or she can do’ (Kristensen 2000).  
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Observing limitations upon potential becomes the premise for developing citizen's resources, and 
we end up with two almost antagonistic gazes at the citizen: limitations/possibilities and 
possibilities/limitations. The reform of early retirement incorporates this paradox into the law so 
that the citizen's right to early retirement can be exercised only when their right to realise their 
potential has been exhaustively explored. The RTRT which explores this can either devise a 
resource trajectory which practically articulates those ‘possibilities from limitations’, or recommend 
a retirement decision (in which case the citizen is observed within the ‘old’ frame of ‘limitations 
upon possibilities’). As a potentialisation technology, RTRT thus says ‘no’ to the automatic right to 
early retirement whenever this right is observed to threaten the citizen’s potential to remain active. 
This rejection is explicit in the former employment minister Mette Frederiksen’s response to 
Parliament to the reform proposals: ‘The main aim of the reform is to prevent early retirements (...) 
Creation of rehabilitation team and resource trajectory in the municipalities, and the establishment 
of clinical function in the regions presents many more opportunities to prevent early retirement than 
there were before the reform’ (Frederiksen 2012).  
 
Potentialisation technologies and societal immunity 
 
We will now further explore how potentialisation might function immunologically, not through 
legal regulation of spontaneous conflict, but through negation of structure and entertainment of 
possibilities. We have seen that when Luhmann discusses law as an immune system, he specifies 
that it puts conflict and contradiction to use as an immune mechanism, and he defines these in terms 
of the articulation of a ‘no’. Although conflict and contradiction do not play as obvious a role with 
potentialisation, its relevance can still clearly be discerned if we observe: a) that each of our 
examples expresses a ‘no’ to structures of some kind; b) that this ‘no’ is at the same time a ‘no to 
no’, c) that this paradoxical ‘double no’ has a distinctly performative character; and d) that it is a 
generalised ‘no’ to structure as such. A synthesis of these features clarifies the nature of 
potentialisation as an immune mechanism. 
 
a) The articulation of a ‘no’ to structure 
 
We have seen that the future reality game expresses an implicit ‘no’ to any expectation of a 
conformal relationship between the past, the present and the future of the organisation. Through this 
‘no’ to the expectation of conformal ‘business as usual’, it aims to open up a new horizon of 
possibilities beyond existing possibilities. In this respect, it is notable that the past is excluded from 
the game, having no place on the grid. Furthermore, through doubling both the present and the 
future, new contradictions can be summoned and mobilised. On the one side, new contradictions are 
summoned between the present present and its present future. On the other side, the future present 
and that future’s future supply another doubling which releases contradictions enabling critique of 
the first pair. A possible future can, in this way, yield a resource for criticising the future-that-
otherwise-will-be. Sisters Academy likewise articulate a ‘no’ to the normal, conformal, expected 
school structures. The contrast between the ‘industrial school’ and its ‘aethetic’ other recruits new 
possible conflicts and contradictions to stimulate dissatisfaction and motivate ‘change’. Finally, 
RTRT articulates a ‘no’ to the expectation of an automatic right to an early retirement pension, but 
in this case too tensions and contradictions can be generated and mobilised between the figure of an 
active participatory citizen who overcomes limitations, and a legal right to retire. In the case of 
RTRT, then, the structure that is negated is law itself. RTRT is precisely not designed to determine 
pension rights, but to provide a means to avoid early retirement decisions (the social pensions Act 
2014, ch. 3, article 18, paragraph. 2). One can say that it functions as an immune mechanism that 
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protects the work of potentialisation by intercepting structural decisions and creating a zone of 
uncertainty about the right to early retirement. A rehabilitation team can recommend a resource 
trajectory lasting up to five years and it can legally recommend yet another resource trajectory. This 
effectively grants a buffer-zone of immunity from the legal structure of rights, meaning that citizens 
who have applied for early retirement have no opportunities for clear and unambiguous 
expectations regarding their legal possibilities for early retirement. 
 
b) The simultaneous articulation of a ‘no’ to a ‘(just say) no’ 
 
If potentialisation technologies say ‘no’ to the authority of social structure, then, according to 
Luhmann’s definition, one might expect them to be in the conflictual business of contradicting 
structure. However, potentialisation also stands opposed to the negativity (‘just say no’) associated 
both with conflicts and with law. Contradictions are recruited and mobilised with a positive agenda 
of producing new potentials and openings. Compared to the legal process of authoritatively 
examining what happened in the light of present law (aiming to restore a balance temporarily lost), 
potentialisation technologies orient towards the imagination of an ideal future in the pedagogical 
name of mutual development. The Rehabilitation Team draws up its Resource Trajectory in a 
bespoke manner on the basis of Svend’s particular possibilities and it claims to do so for the benefit 
of his wellbeing, balanced against that of the collective. When Sally invites her colleagues to play 
the future reality game, it is in the name of making the jobs of Kesi, Morten and co more fun, 
interesting and dynamic whilst simultaneously future-proofing the Health Trust. Sisters Academy 
do not straightforwardly criticise the school and the teachers, but offer a temporary vision of an 
alternative reality that does away with teachers who ‘know’ and pupils who must sit down and 
concentrate on their work. In communicating both a ‘no’ to structures and a ‘no to just say no’, 
potentialisation resonates with Deleuze’s notion of affirmative critique (which says ‘no’ to the 
existing society, whilst positively indicating the emergent virtual of the yet unknown and un-
thought). Potentialisation is a kind of positive critique that does not claim to stand outside 
everything, or to offer authoritative access to a single reality, yet seeks a ‘yes’ to an inherently 
ambivalent and polyphonic system in process of becoming other. It offers the paradox of an 
affirmative negation, a negation of negation (Esposito 2011). 
 
c) The performative basis of the articulated ‘no’ to structure 
 
The affirmative negation described above is supported and afforded by the curious nature of the 
form typically taken by potentialisation technologies. As we have seen, the technologies often take 
the ludic form of games or sports (the ludic form of the future reality game is obvious), the aesthetic 
form of the various arts (the Sisters Academy intervention resembles a piece of theatre) or a 
pedagogic form which mixes play and education (RTRT takes a quasi-pedagogical form). 
Aesthetic, ludic and pedagogical practices share in common a feature of doubling which operates 
with a distinction between ‘the real world’ and a self-created world of the ‘imaginary’, ‘fictional’, 
‘playful’ or ‘hypothetical’ (Stenner, 2017). These forms, in other words, work by ‘suspending’ and 
‘playing’ with and within a liminal space/time that is removed from ordinary structural 
expectations. In this context, whether framed as the play of theatre or that of games, actions become 
performances enjoyed by the other players or the audience. Thanks to this performative form, the 
‘no’ to structure is, as it were, uttered at an ironic distance, and this ‘suspension’ makes it hard for 
conflict to connect with and escalate within situations of potentialisation. Potentialisation 
technologies exploit the subjunctive mood to maintain themselves in the realm of ‘possibility’ and 
‘imagination’ and to avoid actual conflict (those who get angry can be positioned as taking it all too 
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seriously). RTRT is the least ‘performative’ of our examples, but it also operates within a 
‘hypothetical’ space/time in which the multiple possible futures of the client are summoned and 
entertained in the ostensible name of their own development and wellbeing (adopting a pedagogic 
logic). 
 
d) The generalised nature of the ‘no’ to structure 
 
Finally, potentialisation technologies say ‘no’ in a generalised way to structures as such, and not 
just to particular structures. In the future reality game, a general ‘no’ is communicated to any future 
that remains the same as a function of a present conforming to a past. It is not a particular past 
present that is resisted but the very idea of being stuck in the repetition of a past. The ‘no’ of Sisters 
Academy implies the industrial school in its entirety is an institution stuck in the past and doomed 
to repeat its structures. No alternative pedagogical structures are offered beyond the conjuring of a 
structure-free ideal of permanent liminal becoming. When conflicts serve as immune mechanisms 
to communicate ‘no’ within law, by contrast, it is a specific structure that they highlight. For 
example, doctors in Danish psychiatric hospitals got new legal powers to use force with patients in 
1938 as a result of the legal regulation of conflicts. This legal change granting new immunity to 
doctors did not of course resolve such conflicts, but re-situated them onto different ground, inviting, 
for example, new conflicts about where the doctors’ authority begins and ends. Structure as such is 
not challenged, but merely shifted. Law in this way does not simply constrain conflicts, but works 
formatively, controlling and shifting their site and substance. Following the Mental Health Act 
(2006), however, psychiatric hospitals are now obliged to prevent coercion. This opened up new 
relationships between various professions at work in the hospitals, providing fertile grounds for new 
potentialisation technologies to operate in an extra-legal manner, much like RTRT. By means of 
coordinating the perspectives of various professionals, RTRT communicates a general ‘no’ to early 
retirement before alternative options are exhaustively explored.  
 
Synthesis 
 
In sum, when potentialisation says ‘no’ to structures in general, looking for attempts at the radically 
different, it does not distinguish between structures that are worth preserving, and structures that are 
not. It starts a general deflation or dissolving of structures. In the example of the Sisters Academy, 
this indifference to the heterogeneity of structures is expressed when they say: ‘We have no 
knowledge of pedagogy’, even when the entire project is about experimenting with everything in 
the school. With reference to the aesthetic logic, it becomes possible to experiment with educational 
development, without knowing anything about pedagogy. Similarly, in the ‘from reality to the 
ideal’ game, the value of contemporary experience is excluded. With RTRT the imperative is: think 
in possibilities - not in limitations and constraints. When potentialisation technologies double the 
world, they enjoin their participants to stay on the virtual, ‘playful’ side of the difference. Pushing 
the ‘real world’ aside, potentialisation puts everyday knowledge and work experience in jeopardy, 
risking the devaluation of professional knowledge and experience. The principle autoimmune 
danger of potentialisation is thus the paradox of permanent liminality: the possibility of becoming 
stuck within possibility (see Szakolczai, 2017, and Greco and Stenner, 2017, on ‘liminal hotspots’).  
 
It is notable that potentialisation technologies have emerged in a context where structures have been 
identified as a threat to what Luhmann (1995, p. 374) calls the ‘modern welfare society’. Early 
signs of their modern emergence can be found in Mead’s discussion of the increasing relevance in 
the early 20th Century USA of experimental forms of schooling and techniques used in Juvenile 
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Courts to express ‘in terms of affective experience’ matters that would normally take the form of 
objective statements of problems fixed in advance by institutional norms (Mead, 1917). Mead 
observed that these new experimental forms help to avoid an otherwise conflictual and legally 
oriented relationship between the interests of the individual and the state. Since New Public 
Management emerged in the 1980s, however, bureaucratic structures have been increasingly 
identified as a major challenge, especially to the welfare state. Constant change or some form of 
permanent liminality has been proposed as the solution (Andersen & Pors 2017). In addition, since 
2000, the structures that exist in different welfare practices (teaching, healthcare, social work etc) 
have been problematised. In state schools, for example, teachers’ habits, the syllabus, and the 
institutional categories of teacher, class and subject have been diagnosed as structures that impede 
innovation, and even the traditional goal orientation of professionals has been reframed as an 
obstacle to open 'co-creation' between different professional groups (Pors, 2011). The response to 
the problematisation of structure as such is the ideal of an ever-emergent welfare organisation that 
‘builds the road that it moves forward along’ (Andersen & Pors 2016). It seems that the 
potentialisation technologies we are considering are formed under these conditions in which 
societal structures are problematised as obstructions to a fluid ideal. They share the goal of 
potentialisation in that they aim to create new possibilities for what welfare, education, care and 
treatment can be.    
 
Conclusion: When the welfare system protects its operations against its own structures 
 
In addressing potentialisation technologies as a new mode of immunity, this article proposes an 
extension of Luhmann’s observation concerning conflict as immune mechanism and law as immune 
system. This article has dealt with some special types of technology, most evident within the 
welfare sector, whose function is potentialisation: creating radically new possibilities for what 
welfare is and can be. These potentialisation technologies present themselves as positive responses 
concerned with ‘transformation’, ‘radical innovation’ and ‘thinking the unthinkable’. The 
immunological analytic strategy we have offered provides a diagnosis of the present that aims to 
capture how these technologies work. This has enabled insights into how potentialisation 
technologies put the very relation between operation and structure at stake in the management of 
welfare issues.  
 
Social systems have, of course, always evolved by reacting to events in their internally constructed 
environments and creating structures that become taken for granted. What is so interesting today is 
that welfare institutions articulate their own structures as a threat to the continuation of their 
operations. The welfare state is articulated from within as its own threat. Potentialisation 
technologies respond with the positive creation of new possibilities. They say ‘no’ to structures but 
without being negative, and in this way aim to provide space for the innovation and transformation 
of welfare. But in doing all this, they remain systematically blind to their destructive side. They 
indiscriminately attack structures in general, including those established through 
professionalisation, through daily routines, and through legalisation. In this sense they are anti-
structural: they dissolve security around any and every expectation structure, hindering the 
formation and institutionalisation of professional routines and even undermining the legal certainty 
afforded by rights. This resonates with Opitz and Tellmanns’s  (2015) analysis of ‘future 
emergencies’ which can serve to dissolve law’s temporal structure, and Cary Wolfe’s observation 
that a crucial problem for politics ‘is the problem of controlling autoimmunity’ (Wolfe, 2017, p. 
108). For Wolf ‘the political system controls autoimmunity by allowing conflicts within the 
political system between government and opposition to serve the immunitary function of managing 
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conflicts in the broader society’ (Wolfe, 2017, p. 116). We suggest that potentialisation 
technologies represent a new form of controlling autoimmunity with new types of effects. 
 
This destructive side of potentialisation technologies is particularly evident when we consider their 
relation to law. From the perspective of potentialisation, legal rights and legal certainty are at best 
irrelevant and at worst structures that stand in the way of innovation. It is as if potentialisation stood 
in an autoimmune relation to the legal system, protecting welfare state operations against 
juridification. But if law does not regulate these new immune mechanisms, who and what prevents 
potentialisation from running amok? Who and what takes responsibility for the destructive sides of 
potentialisation? 
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